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Based on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or 
soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition 
objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps 
lengthening the regulatory commitment period necessary for incentives. However, such 
commitment for the whole time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is 
impossible. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is thus in 
doubt. Incentive regulation for regular infrastructure investments therefore needs periodic 
updating based on rate-of-return regulation criteria. Innovative infrastructure investments may 
warrant regulatory holidays, which should be conditioned on strict criteria. 
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1. Basic Considerations about Regulation and Investment 
The relationship between regulation and investment appears to be an evergreen 
problem. In fact, regulation in the U.S. started with the investment issue: Franchise 
contracts for new infrastructure evolved into regulation. Doubts about investment 
incentives were swept away by the “Hope” decision (U.S. Supreme Court, 1944), which 
provided for a stable legal foundation of rate-of-return regulation. When I started 
working on regulation in the 1970s the main problem tackled by economists was that of 
regulatory incentives for excessive investment under rate-of-return regulation (Averch-
Johnson effect). In the 1980s and 90s rate-of-return regulation was replaced by incentive 
regulation with an emphasis on cost reduction and efficient pricing. Has investment been 
neglected? What about the over-investment in Telecommunications before 2000/2001? 
Today regulated incumbents complain that regulation stifles their investment incentives. 
Their lobbying resulted, for example, in a heavily contested German telecommunications 
law
2 that provides a regulatory holiday for innovative investment as does current practice 
of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission. Such legal and regulatory measures 
derive their justification from the presumption that the additional benefits from 
(innovation and) investment are going to be high relative to benefits foregone from short-
term cost reductions and/or price reductions.   
Network industries have specific characteristics posing nontrivial investment issues. 
They generally exhibit economies of scale persisting over a wide range of output and 
leading to lumpiness of investments. This lumpiness refers to the size of capacity 
increments, which can be associated with capacity shortages, excess capacity and 
(wasteful) duplicate investments. Furthermore, lumpiness refers to long lead times and 
durability of the investments. A common feature of network investments is sunkness, 
which implies risks associated with real options. Both the option to wait and thereby 
learn about the future and the option to have capacity available when it is needed can be 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank John Kwoka for insightful comments. 
2 § 9a TKG, effective February 24, 2007.   2
valuable and thereby influence investment risk. In addition, competitive risks, for 
example from duplicative investment, can play a major role in investment decisions. 
Examples of industries with (currently) weak competitive risks include electricity 
transmission and distribution networks, while strong competitive risks characterize 
broadband telecommunications access and backhaul and next generation networks 
(NGN). The fibre networks built in the late 1990s show that the competitive race to be 
first can lead to overcapacity.  
The incentive-regulation movement was a reaction to the rate-of-return regulation 
tradition (Vogelsang, 2002). In contrast to the emphasis of rate-of-return regulation on 
potentially excessive investment and its lack of emphasis on productive efficiency and 
low consumer prices incentive regulation put the emphasis on (short-term) productive 
efficiency and low consumer prices. This neglected the tradeoff that investment benefits 
are potentially high relative to benefits from efficient pricing. It does not, however, 
necessarily mean that incentive regulation leads to suboptimal investment levels.  
Different types of investment may be affected differently by regulation in general and 
by incentive regulation in particular. Investment in cost reduction and replacement 
investment, for example, may be positively affected by price-cap or yardstick regulation 
(Borrmann and Brunekreeft, 2009). This would hold to the extent that regulated firms can 
keep the benefits from cost reductions in the form of higher profits. In contrast, 
investment in quality improvements may suffer under these types of regulation because 
lower quality is a substitute for price increases above the cap or benchmark (Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers, 1994; Kwoka, 2009). However, quality improvements may increase 
sales so that empirical effects tend to be inconclusive. For example, Banerjee (2003) 
finds neutral or positive quality effects from moving to price-cap regulation in 
telecommunications retail markets.
3  
Investment in new products and services can be particularly characteristic of some 
network industries, such as the telecommunications sector (in the time of digital 
convergence). Regulation here constrains the upside opportunities. This tends to have less 
importance for end-user regulation, because it rarely exists for such products (such as 
                                                 
3 The survey by Sappington (2005a) on regulation of service quality cites mixed results from the empirical 
literature, but is itself largely restricted to theoretical findings.   3
broadband internet access). It holds, however, for the regulation of new bottleneck inputs 
(essential facilities). In contrast, incentive regulation may be more compatible with 
legacy infrastructure investment by an incumbent. Here the investment problem not only 
concerns the incumbent’s investments but also the investment of alternative competitors 
in complementary infrastructure and in bottleneck bypass.  
In principle, regulation can have ambivalent investment effects.  
For at least two basic reasons regulation can enhance and accelerate investment (in 
bottleneck or bottleneck bypass infrastructure). First, by helping to lower the price of the 
output, regulation increases the demanded output quantity and consequently the capacity 
required to produce this output. Second, successful bottleneck regulation leads to 
enhanced competition, which fires up the race for new bottleneck investment between 
incumbent and entrants (by creating entrants with less of a cannibalization problem than 
the incumbent). 
For at least two other reasons regulation can reduce and retard investments. First, 
regulation lowers the expected investment returns, going along with increases or 
decreases in risks. This works via the truncation of uncertain investment outcomes that 
are caused by price constraints. Investment risks are thereby shifted from consumers and 
the access seekers to the regulated firm. In principle, this truncation can be at least 
partially compensated by an increased WACC (and therefore higher price cap) allowed 
by the regulator. The second reason for reduced or delayed investment is the regulator’s 
lack of commitment, which we will treat extensively below.  
The effects of regulation on investments are the result of incentives and governance. 
We concentrate on regulated prices as the main regulatory incentive variables. The 
current regulated price provides a signal for the expected price, which in turn determines 
output and therefore the required investment to avoid non-price rationing. The price (and 
resulting quantity) determines revenues for financing investment, where – within some 
range - a higher price facilitates investment. A regulatory truncation of the price 
distribution lowers expected returns and affects investment risk.    4
We consider (lack of) regulatory commitment as the main regulatory governance 
variable. Almost always regulators want investment (in fact, too much so!).
4 However, 
regulators also want low prices. Because prices are set after investment, the wish for 
lower prices creates an ex post conflict with the ex ante desire for high investment (Brito 
et al., 2008). Lack of commitment therefore leads to ex post policies detrimental to 
investment. Anticipating this (under lack of commitment) the regulated firm will refrain 
from investing. 
The basic reason for the use of incentives is asymmetric information. Under 
symmetric information the regulator could simply tell the firm what to do. There are two 
fairly distinct methodological approaches to incentive regulation, the Bayesian and the 
non-Bayesian approach. 
The non-Bayesian approach to price regulation goes back to Baumol (1968, 1982), 
Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) and Littlechild (1983). It is based on simple principles 
and aims for welfare improvement, not optimization. It is squarely geared for application, 
but investments have generally not been addressed explicitly in this literature. In contrast, 
the Bayesian approach, initiated by Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole 
(1986)
5 uses a principal-agent framework that allows for full constrained welfare 
optimization. It is in general not directly applicable, but addresses investment incentives 
via commitment. The qualitative insights of this approach are usable for the non-
Bayesian approach taken in this paper.
6 
The strength or power of incentives is measured by the percentage of cost reductions 
the firm may keep or of cost increases that it may have to suffer (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). Under strong incentives the firms keep/suffer a high percentage, while under weak 
incentives they keep/suffer a low percentage. As we show below (in Section 3), the 
power of incentives is quite separate from the tightness of regulation (which is more 
                                                 
4 See, for example, the European Commission staff document on the review of the EU Regulatory 
Framework for electronic communications networks and services, which measures successful 
telecommunications policies in member states by the amount of telecommunications investments 
undertaken.  Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/review/staffworkingdocu
ment_final.pdf. 
5 For penetrating surveys see Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Armstrong and Sappington (2007), who also 
survey non-Bayesian mechanisms. 
6 For a critique of the Bayesian approach, see Vogelsang (2006).   5
related to the participation constraint for the firm). Tightness refers to the (economic or 
excess) profit rate that the regulator is conceding to the firm in case normal expectations 
are fulfilled. Tight regulation refers to a low or zero expected profit rate and usually is 
associated with a low regulated price. Conversely, soft regulation refers to a high 
expected profit rate and usually a high regulated price. Intermediate regulation would lie 
between tight and soft regulation. 
The power of incentives is closely related to the risk that the regulated firm is bearing. 
Different types of price regulation can with some caution be ranked by the 
risks/incentives they provide for the firm. Rate-of-return regulation and other cost-plus 
regulations generally provide low risk and weak incentives. Profit-sharing regulation is 
associated with medium risk/incentives. Price-cap regulation as the next step carries 
medium to high risk/incentives. In the list, yardstick/benchmarking regulation (including 
engineering cost models) comes up with the highest risk/strongest incentives. While these 
are ranked from low risk/weak incentives to high risk/strong incentives, the regulator can 
make compensating adjustments either through incentive-mitigating measures, such as 
true-ups from time to time, or through adjusting the tightness of regulation. 
In order to assess the effects of regulation on investment we concentrate on two types 
of beneficiaries of regulation and two types of infrastructure investment.  
Regulation can either concern provision of services to end users or access of 
alternative providers to competitive bottlenecks. Here “bottleneck” is used in the sense of 
an essential facility, which is a necessary input (fixed proportions) that is owned by an 
incumbent and cannot be duplicated economically by potential entrants (natural 
monopoly property). Examples of such bottlenecks include transmission and distribution 
networks in electricity that would have to be used by competing electricity generators to 
reach potential customers. They also include local loops in fixed telephone networks that 
have to be used by local and long-distance carriers to originate and terminate calls. 
End-user regulation generally tries to prevent exploitation of consumers and shall 
lead to competitive prices, while bottleneck regulation tries to enhance competition and 
prevent foreclosure. Both types of regulation could prevent predation.   6
The relevant investment can concern competitive bottlenecks or complementary 
infrastructure downstream or upstream of the bottleneck. In both cases the investor can 
either be the regulated incumbent or unregulated competitors.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 End-user regulation 
A growing literature has emerged recently on the relationship between investment 
and regulation. This has, however not yet led to very clear results.
7 Unsurprisingly, the 
early work has concentrated on rate-of-return regulation, while the newer work 
emphasizes incentive regulation, price caps in particular, and sometimes compares rate-
of-return regulation (or other types of cost-based regulation) with price caps. We will 
here concentrate more on theoretical than on empirical contributions, largely because a 
large part of the empirical work appears to be quite weak and driven by partisan 
considerations.
8 While the conventional wisdom is that rate-of-return regulation is likely 
associated with excessive investment, the literature is actually more differentiated. First, 
it has been know since Averch and Johnson (1962) that the excessive investment result 
only holds for an allowed rate of return ‘s’ between the monopoly rate ‘m’ and the cost of 
capital ‘r’ (r<s<m). In the more realistic model formulation of Bawa and Sibley (1980) a 
higher allowed rate than m would lead to no change in investment compared to no 
regulation or even to reduced investment. Similarly, a rate of return at s=r would lead to 
efficiency and s<r would lead to underinvestment. The original results of Averch and 
Johnson were qualified   
•  by considerations of regulatory lag (Baumol and Klevorick, 1970; Bailey and 
Coleman, 1971). Such a lag would generally reduce the overcapitalization bias 
but could also lead to undercapitalization (Joskow and MacAvoy, 1975). With 
an endogenous lag that decreases in the deviation between actual and allowed 
                                                 
7 For reviews of the literature on regulation and investment see Guthrie (2006) and, specifically for the case 
of broadband investment, Cambini and Jiang (2009). 
8 This definitely shines through in Cambini and Jiang (2009). They have only found two papers on end-user 
regulation and telecommunications infrastructure investment (Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller, 1995, and 
Ai and Sappington, 2002). In contrast, they list 23 works on access regulation and infrastructure 
investment, but quite a few of these are either not really empirical (simulations and numerical examples) or 
financed by incumbents or organizations of alternative competitors. None of these 23 papers has been 
published in a top economics journal.      7
rate of return efficiency can be reached even if the allowed rate exceeds the 
cost of capital (Bawa and Sibley, 1980).   
•  by different valuations of the rate base (largely historic costs versus 
replacement costs). Evans and Guthrie (2005, 2006) note that replacement 
cost valuation can expose the regulated firm to asset price risks.   
•  by addressing a used-and-useful criterion for investments to be included in the 
rate base (Gilbert and Newbery, 1994; Newbery, 2000). Gilbert and Newbery, 
in particular, argue that rate-of-return regulation with a used-and-useful 
criterion (as practiced?) is likely to lead to an efficient amount of investment. 
In contrast, Égert (2009) argues that the used-and-useful criterion introduces 
uncertainty into the regulatory process that would lead to underinvestment or 
a biased type of investment. This is also implied by Evan’s and Guthrie’s 
(2006, 2006) critique of the use of optimized replacement costs that do not 
include excess capacity for the case of demand uncertainty. Such excess 
capacity would not appear to be “used and useful” in states of low demand 
and would therefore be disqualified for inclusion in the rate base by regulators 
(Baumol and Sidak, 2002).  
Thus, it appears that the effects of rate-of-return regulation on investment would 
heavily depend on the way it is actually handled by regulators and courts. 
A positive relationship between price-cap regulation and investment was established 
early on by Cabral and Riordan (1989) for the case of cost-reducing investments. This 
was, however, limited to the full commitment case (infinite time horizon) and to a 
specialized type of investment. Later work came to much more qualified conclusions, 
finding that positive investment effects would depend on the length of commitment 
(Biglaiser and Riordan, 2000) and on the level of the cap (Nagel and Rammerstorfer, 
2008; Roques and Savvas, 2006 and 2009). These latter works use a real-option approach 
so that the price cap triggering optimal investment is highly dependent on sunkness and 
uncertainty. Generally, overestimating the cap seems to have less dire consequences for 
investment than underestimating it. Dobbs (2004) finds that, because of the truncation 
problem inherent in capped prices, underinvestment would arise even under optimal price 
caps and would lead to non-price rationing (= deteriorated quality). All this work, just   8
like in the case of rate-of-return regulation, strongly suggests that the investment effects 
of price-cap regulation clearly depend on the way the regulation is handled in practice. 
Sobel (1999) finds that yardstick regulation, by using information on low-cost firms 
(ex post), may prevent optimal investment (ex ante) of regulated firms. Borrmann and 
Brunekreeft (2009), in a sunk-cost model under certainty, show that yardstick regulation 
leads to postponement of expansion investment (relative to the social optimum, though 
not necessarily relative to unconstrained profit maximization), while it accelerates 
replacement investment.              
The work on the relationship between profit-sharing regulation and investment seems 
to be restricted to Panteghini and Scarpa (2003) and Moretto, Panteghini and Scarpa 
(2008).
9 They find that under uncertainty straightforward RPI-X price caps lead to higher 
investment than profit sharing regulation. While insightful these papers seem to derive 
their results from their asymmetric definition of profit sharing, where “sharing” only 
occurs if the profits exceed a certain level. Thus, profit sharing does not reduce the firm’s 
risk because it only happens in the good states of the world. Rather, it prevents the firm 
from reaping the upside potential in the good states that would be necessary for 
compensating downside risks in bad states. This result has potential practical importance, 
because asymmetric profit sharing is actually used by some regulators. It is also highly 
intuitive but it says very little about the effect of real, i.e. symmetric, profit sharing, 
where the firm would have some downside protection. Such symmetric profit sharing 
would have price caps and rate-of-return regulation as polar cases with price caps as zero 
sharing and rate-of-return regulation as 100% sharing. 
Interestingly, the two main empirical papers on the relationship between different 
types of regulation and investment in telecom network modernization show larger 
investments in incentive regulation regimes (price caps in particular) compared to rate-of-
return regulation (Greenstein et al., 1995; Ai and Sappington, 2002). This may be due to 
the fact that, in its practical application, incentive regulation in the U.S. was quite soft to 
begin with. 
                                                 
9 In addition, Weisman (2005) considers the relationship of profit-sharing regulation with investments in 
quality.   9
2.2 Access price regulation  
The theoretical literature on the relationship between access price regulation for 
monopolistic bottlenecks and investment is quite diversified regarding the issues 
addressed.
10  
A sizeable part of the literature is mainly concerned with the effect of the regulated 
access price on the incentive of the bottleneck owner/incumbent to invest in new or 
expanded infrastructure, independent of the effect on potential alternative competitors. 
The concern here is predominantly with access prices based on TELRIC/LRAIC.
11 The 
main argument is that access prices/prices for unbundled network elements that do not 
cover all costs of investment would stifle investments. Proponents of the 
TELRIC/LRAIC approach argue that by definition these two cost concepts include all 
costs of expansion investments in new infrastructure. Thus, any shortfall in (expected) 
coverage of investment costs would have to come from cost measurement errors or 
mistakes in the underlying models. Potential errors could come (a) from measurement of 
the required capacities under lumpiness paired with uncertain/fluctuating demand and (b) 
from measurement of costs of capital (WACC) under sunkness. Opponents of the 
TELRIC/LRAIC approach here argue that the regulators systematically err by not 
including enough reserve capacities and by making no WACC adjustments for real 
options. Comacho and Menezes (2009) show that failure to include real options of delay 
(under an ECPR approach) leads to sub-optimal investments. In contrast, their alternative 
of using an Option to Delay Pricing Rule (OPDR) essentially requires the regulator to be 
fully informed about market conditions and thereby be able to implement the optimal 
end-user prices directly. In my view, regulators probably err in the wrong direction by not 
including the value of real options in the calculations for costs of capital (WACC) for 
TELRIC/LRAIC. 
Another concern for investment incentives of the incumbent could come from 
spillover effects of the investment on the demand for entrants’ services. Technology 
upgrades, from which entrants would benefit, would fall under such spillovers. 
                                                 
10 We leave out (2-way) interconnection regulation, which seems to be restricted to telecommunications. 
This leaves out, in particular, the termination issue. See Vogelsang (2003). 
11 TELRIC stands for “Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost”, while LRAIC stands for “Long-Run 
Average Incremental Cost”. Both of these are usually measured in analytical cost models.   10
Incumbents would have reduced incentives for such investments if they have to provide 
access at prices that are less profitable than their downstream prices (Kotakorpi, 2006). 
A second large part of the access-related literature addresses the incentive effects of 
unbundling obligations on competitors’ investments. This literature specifically centers 
on the stepping-stone or ladder-of-investment hypothesis (partially due to Cave and 
Vogelsang, 2003). The ladder-of-investment hypothesis claims that entry by alternative 
providers in a market dominated by an incumbent is hindered by the necessity to acquire 
assets with a range of bottleneck properties. As time goes by, as entrants learn and as they 
grow in size (thereby availing themselves of economies of scale), they can climb an 
investment ladder with increasing bottleneck properties. Foreseeing that development the 
regulator should begin by forcing the incumbent to make all bottleneck inputs available at 
attractive prices thereby enabling entry. However, the regulator should commit to 
reducing the attractiveness of regulated access over time, beginning with inputs with less 
bottleneck properties. This is meant to increase incentives for alternative providers to 
actually invest in assets with increasing bottleneck properties because regulated access 
becomes less and less attractive.  
The ladder-of-investment hypothesis has been embraced by European 
telecommunications regulators but has been criticized in the literature. Burreau and 
Doğan (2006) point out in a theoretical model that with increasing availability of 
alternative or bypass infrastructure the incumbent bottleneck owner would voluntarily 
provide bottleneck access at increasingly attractive terms for the alternative competitors, 
thereby retarding bypass. Thus, according to them, instead of increasing regulated access 
prices as bypass becomes more and more available, the regulator should prohibit 
unbundled access, once bypass becomes economical because otherwise bypass would 
come too late. The authors claim that, for the same reason, regulatory sunset clauses 
would not help.
12 However, a major problem with both an application of the ladder-of-
investment approach and with the Bourreau and Doğan suggestion is that the regulator 
will generally not know, when bypass is sufficiently feasible and that this feasibility will 
differ locally across the country.  
                                                 
12 Avenali et al. (2010), in what appears to be the first theoretical model of the ladder-of-investment 
hypothesis, show that under their assumptions the Bourreau and Doğan assessment of the ladder-of-
investment approach and of sunset clauses would not hold.   11
A counter-argument to the ladder-of-investment approach similar to that raised by 
Bourreau and Doğan can be derived from the inclusion of real options in the incumbent’s 
access costs. Accordingly, for sunk bottleneck access the risk of bypass would justify 
initial surcharges on conventional TELRIC/LRAIC calculations but these would no 
longer be feasible, once bypass occurs, thus leading to a declining path of access prices.  
The ladder-of-investment approach assumes that bypass is based on an extension of 
investments in the same legacy technology of the incumbent. In reality, however, it 
usually occurs through a new technology or improvement of another technology that is 
different from the legacy infrastructure of the incumbent. Examples of the former could 
be FTTH or VDSL,
13 through which the bypass opportunities may deteriorate. An 
example of the latter is a cable TV network that competes with the telephone/DSL 
network of the incumbent and of entrants using the incumbent’s technology. The ladder-
of-investment approach does not work here because (a) the entrants cannot effectively 
duplicate the incumbent’s local loops and (b) the cable TV company investments may be 
jeopardized by any boost given to the incumbent by selling access to the entrants. In a 
way, the entrants climb the wrong ladder in this case.  
Overall, the working of the ladder-of-investment approach appears to be strongly 
depending on the circumstances of the industry as well as on the way it is implemented 
by the regulator.
14  
A third part of the access-related literature concentrates on the interaction of the 
effects on incumbents and entrants. Gans (2001), for example, suggests an optimal two-
part access tariff that ensures optimal investment of a regulated firm that has to 
immediately grant access to this new infrastructure to rivals. Thus, the formula both 
provides for the optimal timing of investment and helps preempt competing investments 
by potential rivals.  
                                                 
13 FTTH stands for “Fiber To The Home”, while VDSL stands for “Very-High-Data-Rate Digital 
Subscriber Line” and can usually be seen as “Fiber To The Neighborhood”. 
14 The empirical literature cited by Cambini and Jiang (2009) on this subject, for example, appears to be 
fairly blind to subtle aspects of this approach. If, for example, Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) find that low 
UNE-P rates in the U.S. are associated with a decrease in CLEC-owned telephone lines that does not 
contradict the ladder-of-investment approach. Because a large part of the network elements covered by 
UNE-P are clearly replicable they should actually be priced highly in order to spur CLEC investment. In 
contrast, unbundled loops should be priced lowly. UNE-P stands for the platform of unbundled network 
elements that allowed entrants to offer network services almost without having any own network 
infrastructure.   12
Several papers deal with incumbent and entrant investment in models that capture a 
new industry, in which two firms have to decide, which one will invest first and in which 
access regulation has been established before (Hori and Mizuno, 2006; Vareda and 
Hoernig, 2007). Here, low access charges usually (but not always) retard both the 
incumbent’s (initial) and the entrant’s investments, while high access charges lead to 
preemptive strategies.  
The empirical literature on both incumbent and entrant investment includes Grajek 
and Röller (2009), whose estimations relate to telecommunications investments in fixed 
networks. They find a negative relationship between access regulation and individual 
incumbents’ and entrants’ investments, although total entrants’ investments increase. In 
addition, incumbents invest more in response to entrants’ investment increases. The 
effect of regulation is found only, when controlling for the endogeneity of access 
regulation. In particular, regulators are found to tighten regulation in response to 
increased investments by incumbents. 
3. Regulation Under Full Commitment 
3.1 The case for intermediate regulation 
My approach to regulation and investment can be characterized as follows. The 
literature on the relationship between regulation, investments and innovation suggests 
many different case-specific outcomes. This to me suggests ample employment 
opportunities for economists as advisors to regulators, incumbents, alternative 
competitors and consumer groups. Keeping the cases apart and deriving case-specific 
regulations is highly information-intensive and may be subject to moral hazard and 
adverse selection on the side of the regulators.  I have dealt with regulators in a number 
of countries and have again and again been impressed by their knowledge, skills and 
ethics. Nevertheless, there are things that regulators cannot and probably should not do. 
Among them is taking responsibility for infrastructure investment decisions and for 
innovations. My approach is to use simple economics and insights from the literature for 
extracting some fairly general properties and to come up with a few rough-and-ready 
rules. They may do injustice to the individual case but are more likely to be feasible for   13
implementation and less subject to commitment problems than more specific case-
dependent rules. 
Consider first the relationship between the regulated (bottleneck) price and the 
incumbent’s infrastructure investment, as depicted in Figure 1. The simplified view 
illustrated by the investment function (correspondence) combines two constraints on 
investment. The shape of the function is assumed to be affected by cost and demand 
risks. In particular, the risk results in a thick corridor in the horizontal portion. This leads 
to asymmetric effects of tight vs. soft regulation. Tight regulation can potentially lead to 
high investment, due to the implied large demanded quantity. However, it could also lead 
to zero investment if the regulated firm (or the capital market) views the investment as 
being too risky at that price. In contrast, a price increase to the level of soft regulation 
implies no regulatory risk (under full commitment), but leads (for sure) to fairly small 
investment. Intermediate regulation leads to substantially higher investment that can also 
be virtually assured. The view exposed in this argumentation contrasts with most of the 
literature, which largely neglects any demand-side effects from lower prices.   
  
Figure 1: A simplified view of infrastructure investment as a function of price: 
Soft vs. tight regulation 
 
 
In Table 1 we differentiate between several types of infrastructure for investment 
purposes. Bottleneck infrastructure (to which the access is regulated) could either be 
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competitors (column 2). The latter would not strictly represent bottlenecks, which by 
definition could not economically be duplicated by others. However, the regulatory 
restructuring and reform movement is based on the premise that new technical and 
market developments can potentially abolish or reduce bottlenecks over time and that this 
can be helped by regulation. A low regulated price for bottleneck access could have 
facilitated competitive entry. However, a continued low access price can discourage 
entrants from investing in bottleneck bypass, while an increased access price could 
induce bypass investment. This is the ladder-of-investment aspect (Cave and Vogelsang, 
2003; Cave, 2006). In addition, the entrants may be more likely to invest in new types of 
bottleneck infrastructure, while the replacement effect of such infrastructure may prevent 
the incumbent from doing so (Bourreau and Doğan, 2004; Hori and Mizuno, 2009). Low 
access prices may therefore initially increase both competition for the market and 
competition in the market. However, the increased competition in the market will make 
competition for the market unattractive. The next type of infrastructure concerns 
investments downstream or upstream of the bottleneck and is generally not regulated. 
This infrastructure can again be that of a vertically integrated incumbent (column 3) or it 
could be alternative competitors’ infrastructure (column 4). The infrastructure 
downstream or upstream of the bottleneck is by assumption no bottleneck (otherwise it 
would be included there) and therefore basically similar for both the vertically integrated 
incumbent and the competitors.
15 The competitors will generally have newer 
infrastructure, though. Last, there could be access-related infrastructure. 
 
Table 1: Effects of tightness of bottleneck regulation on infrastructure 
investment in absence of retail regulation 
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15 The incumbent, however, may be able to shift costs between the two production stages and thereby gain a 
competitive advantage. See Laffont and Tirole (2000).    15
 
Figure 1 provides the basis for the “Incumbent Bottleneck” column in Table 1. 
Accordingly, tight regulation can only have a positive effect on investment if there is no 
cost uncertainty. Otherwise, tight regulation would choke investment. In contrast, soft 
regulation has a positive effect at high uncertainty and inelastic demand, but can have 
substantial negative effects if uncertainty is less and demand more elastic. Intermediate 
regulation would balance the two tendencies.  
The second column indicates that competitive bypass investment is discouraged by 
tight bottleneck regulation, because access to the incumbent’s bottleneck is then cheaper 
than bypass. In contrast, soft regulation makes bypass attractive if bypass is fully 
possible. Intermediate regulation makes bypass attractive if bypass is partially possible. 
This line of reasoning about bypass investment is questioned by Sappington (2005b), 
who shows in theoretical models that the tightness of bottleneck regulation is just 
compensated by the incumbent’s competitive reactions downstream. This means that 
tight regulation is accompanied by aggressive downstream competition, while soft 
regulation would be accompanied by more collusive behaviour. As a result, the 
alternative competitors will only invest in bottleneck bypass if they can do so more 
cheaply than the incumbent and that will be independent of the regulated bottleneck 
access charge. The question if this behaviour is restricted to Sappington’s model 
assumptions or if it holds more generally has been analyzed by Mandy (2009), who finds 
that input prices generally do matter for the efficient make-or-buy decision and that 
efficient decisions can be induced by pricing the input access at the entrant’s marginal 
cost (of bypass). This may, however, leave the entrants out in the cold if they cannot 
economically duplicate the bottleneck facility.  
Because of mostly fixed proportions between bottleneck and complementary 
investments the last two columns of Table 1 simply parallel the first two. Accordingly, 
tight bottleneck regulation increases downstream output and downstream investment 
overall. However, the distribution of investment between incumbent and competitors may 
depend on their relative efficiency downstream. A relatively more (less) efficient 
incumbent will invest more (less).    16
Table 2 displays effects of the tightness of end-user regulation on infrastructure 
investments. Here the results for competitive bypass and downstream investments are 
opposite to the case of bottleneck regulation, because - in contrast to the latter - end-user 
regulation does not benefit but rather tends to handicap competitors. Tight end-user 
regulation of the incumbent acts like increased competition in the market and therefore 
makes competition for the market less attractive. As a result, entry will be reduced and 
exit increased. There is a possibility though that (in an oligopolistic setting) alternative 
competitors already in the market may expand when end-user regulation tightens up. The 
effects of soft end-user regulation would then just be the reverse.  
The effects of tightness of end-user regulation on the incumbent’s investment are 
quite similar to those of bottleneck regulation except that there are additional effects from 
the way end-user regulation affects alternative competitors. The negative effect of tight 
regulation on the incumbent’s investment may therefore be somewhat buffered by the 
reduction in the number of competitors and the positive effect of soft regulation may be 
somewhat neutralized by increased competition.      
 
Table 2: Effects of tightness of end-user regulation on infrastructure investment 
        Investment  











tight -/+  -(+)  -/+  -(+) 
intermediate +  0  +  0 
soft +/-  +(-) +/-  +(-) 
 
On the bottleneck level tight regulation appears to be best for upstream/downstream 
investment and soft regulation best for bottleneck and bypass investment. The best 
overall approach to end-user regulation depends on the relative weight and relative 
sunkness of bottleneck infrastructure vs. other infrastructure. Intermediate regulation 
appears to be the generally best compromise. On the end-user level soft/intermediate 
regulation virtually dominates for all types of investment. Soft regulation enhances 
competition as long as foreclosure can be avoided via bottleneck regulation. Soft   17
bottleneck regulation can therefore increase price-squeeze problems. This assessment is 
in line with the view that end-user markets should be deregulated first.
16    
3.2 Intermediate regulation as incentive regulation 
We have seen that intermediate or even soft regulation may provide better investment 
incentives than tight regulation. Incentive regulation, however, seems to call for a tight 
approach. How then can soft regulation provide efficiency incentives?
17 Consider 
different types of incentive regulation.  
Soft profit-sharing regulation could mean  
(a)  a soft definition of (excess) profits. Such an approach to softness would 
preserve incentives, because it would preserve the extent to which the 
regulated firm remains a residual claimant.  
(b)  more (= a higher percentage of) sharing. This would mean a move in the 
direction of rate-of-return regulation. Such a move reduces incentives.  
(c)  asymmetric sharing in favor of the regulated firm, meaning that the firm 
would suffer a smaller share of any losses and gain a larger share of any 
profits.
18 Such softness would likely lead to overinvestment, because the firm 
would face reduced risks.  
Soft price-cap regulation means a higher cap. Generally, the cost-reducing incentives 
are deemed largely independent of the price-cap level so that incentives would be 
preserved. In contrast, investment incentives would be increased (Roques and Savvas, 
2006, 2009; Nagel and Rammerstorfer, 2008). There would be an allocative inefficiency, 
though. Under end-user regulation part of this inefficiency would (in the long run) be 
balanced by increased competitive pressure. Under bottleneck regulation part of the 
reduced downstream competition would be balanced by bypass incentives.  
Regulation based on analytical cost models (LRAIC or TELRIC) provides intrinsic 
efficiency incentives if the models are independent of the incumbent’s actual costs. Soft 
                                                 
16 We have in this simple analysis not considered any interactions between bottleneck regulation and end-
user regulation. 
17 In the following we assume that firms are maximizing profits and therefore fully respond to incentives 
instead of incurring X-inefficiency.   
18 This is the opposite of the sharing studied in Panteghini and Scarpa (2003) and Moretto et al. (2008), 
which led to underinvestment.   18
regulation here could be implemented via a higher built-in rate of return (which could be 
more than a simple risk surcharge). In particular, regulators could include a surcharge for 
real options in case of sunk assets (err in favor of including real options). There could be 
additional uncertainty from the replacement cost approach used in such models (Evans 
and Guthrie, 2005).  
Benchmarking (yardstick) regulation is usually applied in reference to an actual 
efficiency frontier provided by a set of firms. While regulated rates on the frontier would 
represent tight regulation, intermediate or soft regulation could allow for a pre-set 
distance from the efficiency frontier. Also, under soft regulation the rate could be based 
on the cost average of the firms rather than on the frontier. Efficiency would be preserved 
to the extent that the benchmark is independent of the particular regulated firm’s 
behavior. 
Last, under Bayesian regulation one could allow for a positive (economic) profit at 
the participation constraint. This could lead to similar productivity incentives but higher 
expected profits.  
Thus, with the exception of some forms of profit sharing soft/intermediate regulation 
appears to be fully compatible with providing cost-reducing/productivity-enhancing 
incentives.   
However, what is the yardstick for intermediate regulation and how can it be 
implemented? Criteria for tight regulation can usually be established with some precision 
and therefore be framed in regulatory rules/laws. In contrast, soft/intermediate regulation 
may require regulatory discretion.
19 Verifiable criteria for “intermediate” are hard to 
come by. One could therefore establish a two-step procedure.  
Step 1 would involve establishing and applying criteria for applicability of tight vs. 
soft/intermediate regulation, keeping in mind that soft/intermediate resembles light 
regulation and can therefore be viewed as a step in the direction of deregulation. For 
example, under the ladder-of-investment approach, soft/intermediate regulation may be 
inappropriate in markets with routine (small, short-run) investments without bypass 
opportunities. In such markets, any move towards deregulation would be unwarranted, 
and surcharges on the firm’s cost of capital would be unnecessary for triggering 
                                                 
19 The commitment problem is treated extensively below.   19
investments. In contrast, softer regulation would be justified under increased uncertainty, 
increased sunkness and increased bypass possibilities.  
Step 2 would then involve choosing a specific type of soft/intermediate regulation, 
given that it has first been established as necessary/appropriate. Examples of intermediate 
regulation that have been codified include a combination of ex post regulation and the 
application of competition law criteria in the German Telecommunications Act of 2003. 
This approach gives the incumbent some flexibility because he/she does not have to get 
permission first before setting prices. At the same time, the criterion for regulatory 
intervention is not based on efficient costs (which are the criterion for ex ante regulation 
in the same law) but rather on non-abusive prices.
20 Another approach that would be 
applicable in case of reasonable downstream competition is the Efficient Component 
Pricing Rule (ECPR).
21 Benchmarking based on averages rather than on frontier costs 
would be another example for intermediate regulation. This would be a pricing approach 
where clear differentiation of criteria is possible. A radical approach on the governance 
level would be the choice of a pro-industry regulator (Evans, Levine and Trillas, 2008). 
As a general rule, at the same expected returns, the stronger the power of incentives, 
the greater the risk that the firm faces.
22 As a result, regulatory mechanisms with stronger 
incentives will be associated with higher costs of capital for the regulated firm. In that 
sense, regulation may have to be softer for inducing investments the stronger the 
incentives the regulation provides. My reading from the empirical and theoretical 
literature is that, initially, the move from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation 
or from state-owned (“unregulated”) to privatized incentive-regulated enterprises has 
involved quite soft regulation. This happened both because of inexperience and 
cautiousness of the regulators, who are highly afraid of service interruptions, and because 
of large potentials for efficiency improvements. After some time, this cautiousness and 
potential productivity improvements wear out so that regulation becomes tighter. That 
                                                 
20 Non-abusive prices include normal (workably-competitive) markups on the firm’s actual costs (rather 
than prices equal efficient costs). 
21 Kotakorpi (2006) argues that incumbents’ investments in infrastructure with demand spillovers to 
entrants would only be efficient if the incumbent can earn as much from selling access as from selling 
downstream. This would suggest using the ECPR but may, at the same time, favor some downstream 
regulation. 
22 Risk may also have increased through other aspects of regulatory restructuring, such as vertical 
separation or pro-competitive policies (Kwoka, 2009).   20
may be the reason why Greenstein et al. (1995) and Ai and Sappington (2002) found 
positive relationships between the introduction of incentive regulation and investment. It 
may also be the reason why incumbents today complain about the lack of investment 
incentives. This would suggest a return to “softer” regulation.         
4. Ordinary investments vs. innovative investments 
We now want to contrast the effects of regulation on ordinary investments vs. on 
innovative (infrastructure) investments, which are particularly relevant for the 
telecommunications sector.
23  
Ordinary investments concern maintenance, replacement or expansion of legacy 
infrastructure. From a regulatory perspective they are characterized by fairly well-known 
costs and well-known demands so that (analytical) cost models developed in the past 
could be fully applicable. Nevertheless, some problems of sunk costs remain so that a 
surcharge for real options may need to be added to the WACC. Unbundling and 
competitive network access is feasible (e.g., in telecommunications), leading to sufficient 
downstream competition and downstream deregulation.  
In contrast, innovative investments concern new types of infrastructure. The costs are 
little known and highly uncertain. Because they are usually also associated with new end-
user products (at least in telecommunications) their demand is hard to assess and there is 
a risk of low penetration and low capacity utilization. Initially, there will be high average 
costs based on the large sunk costs of getting the incumbent started. Penetration pricing 
below costs can help the start but may be hard to distinguish from foreclosure and 
predation. Unbundling and access regulation are inherently difficult because of the lack 
of experience with the new technology (Faulhaber, 2003). At the same time innovative 
infrastructure is more likely a case of symmetry in starting positions between incumbent 
and other market players so that a possible race for investment could ensue.  
The question arising from all of this is if innovative investments should be a case for 
deregulation (or for lack of regulation to begin with). This begs the further question how 
                                                 
23 Kwoka, in a mail to the author, points out that the quality may be more important than innovation for the 
functioning of incentive regulation. Both quality and innovation appear to be problems that incentive 
regulation cannot easily deal with. For innovation the question is if deregulation is called for or if WACC 
adjustments suffice. For quality the question is if incentive regulation of prices has to be complemented by 
specific quality regulation. For more on the latter see Kwoka (2009).     21
the decision between regulation and no regulation should be made. Since the regulation in 
question is based on bottleneck/essential facilities properties and therefore market power, 
deregulation or no regulation means that the particular market would be governed solely 
by competition policy. From a normative perspective, deregulation is therefore 
appropriate if competition policy (alone) is providing a higher level of welfare than 
regulation (with or without additional competition policy).  
The decision between regulation and competition policy requires a comparative 
evaluation of the two in solving the (bottleneck) problem at hand. This in turn requires an 
assessment of the main properties of regulation and competition policy. Table 3 provides 
the characteristic properties of regulation with their advantages and drawbacks.
24  All 
three specific characteristics (ex ante remedies, specialized agency and prescriptive 
intervention) tend to lead to strong and preventative interventions that can potentially 
prevent large damages from anticompetitive behavior. At the same time those 
characteristics reduce the freedom of the incumbent to compete and discover new 
possibilities.   
 
Table 3: Properties of regulation 
Properties of regulation  Advantages  Drawbacks 
Ex ante remedies   Immediacy, precision, 
dependability, prevention  
Reduction of freedom to 
compete, too much 
intervention  
Specialized agency   Specialized knowledge, 
speed of intervention 
Influence of interest groups, 






Strong influence on desired 
behavior, precision  
Reduction of freedom to 
compete, inefficient 
prescriptions because of 
asymmetric information; 
too much intervention  
 
The contrasting characteristics of general competition law are named in the first 
column of Table 4. The requirement to show a violation before action is taken makes 
competition law (alone) inappropriate  
•  if violations result in large, irreparable damages,  
                                                 
24 This and the following table are adapted from Holznagel and Vogelsang (2009).   22
•  if violations are hard to prove,  
•  if they occur frequently and repeatedly.  
In principle, competition law could remain appropriate even under such 
circumstances if penalties and compensation payments for violations were large enough 
to prevent such violations and damages (Shavell, 1984). In practice, penalties and 
compensations are limited and uncertain and therefore insufficient to prevent such 
violations and damages. Competition policy remedies can also be insufficiently tailored 
to pricing situations and quality-related violations and can be hard to maintain over time. 
These properties largely disqualify sole reliance on competition law in situations where 
incumbents own monopolistic bottlenecks that cannot reasonably be duplicated by 
alternative competitors and that are necessary for competing in the end-user markets 
served by the bottlenecks.  
 
Table 4: Inappropriateness of general competition law 
Property of 
competition law  
Competition law inappropriate 
if....  
Relevant for...  
Requirement to 
show violation  
Large, irreparable damages 
(compensated by large penalties?) 
Difficult to prove abuses, e.g. 
Denial of access hidden by slowing 
down negotiations  
Frequent and repeated abuses  




Inability to set prices   Lack of comparable markets 
Economies of scale and scope 
Long duration of intervention in a 
changing environment  
Access to monopolistic  
bottlenecks 
Market dominance in access 
market 











As tables 3 and 4 show, the choice between sector-specific regulation and general 
competition policy always involves tradeoffs. These tradeoffs may be strongly affected if 
investments by an incumbent involve technological change. In particular, the advantages   23
of regulation and disadvantages of competition policy will become less relevant if the 
alternative under regulation is no or insufficient innovation.  
There are two arguments for deregulation of or regulatory holidays for innovative 
infrastructure. First, the patent argument states that you get more innovation from the 
additional freedom and lack of profit constraint provided by an extended period of no 
regulation, and that this additional innovation is more valuable than the potential 
deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. Second, the error argument states that regulation 
of innovative infrastructure is inherently more complicated than regulation of legacy 
infrastructure. Also, potential benefits from innovation are much higher than benefits 
from regulation. The error from false and distorting regulation is therefore more likely 
and more severe than in the case of legacy infrastructure. These arguments do not mean 
that the potential for innovation automatically calls for the absence of regulation.
25 
However, the cards would be more heavily stacked against regulation the more important 
innovation becomes.  
Thus, how can one distinguish ordinary from innovative investments? One potentially 
workable approach is the notion of “emerging markets” under the EU communications 
framework. This notion is based on the property that “the three-criteria test cannot be 
applied.” The three-criteria test stipulates that a dominant firm in a market defined by 
competition law criteria should be regulated if (1) there are high and stable barriers to 
entry, (2) competition is not expected to increase in the foreseeable future and (3) the first 
two market failures cannot be adequately dealt with through competition policy 
instruments. These last three criteria have to be met cumulatively (i.e., all have to hold 
together). The non-applicability of the three-criteria test essentially means that either a 
market cannot (yet) be defined for the product in question or that one cannot measure if 
there are high and enduring entry barriers or if competition is likely to be effective or if 
competition policy could effectively deal with those entry barriers or lack of competition. 
This notion of emerging markets takes an extremely narrow view of innovations and, to 
the best of my knowledge, has as of yet not shown any innovation to qualify as an 
                                                 
25 Competition policy has to deal with its own potential error costs. For the case of innovations, see Manne 
and Wright (2009).   24
emerging market. A weaker concept might be the creation of a new market in the 
competition policy sense. 
5. Long-term Investment and Variable Commitment 
5.1. A Two-period framework 
The importance of commitment for incentive regulation has been emphasized in the 
literature for a long time. In particular, Laffont and Tirole’s (1993) long treatise of 
incentive regulation provides for extensive analysis of conflicts between the strength of 
incentives and the strength of commitment.
26 Under lack of commitment productivity 
gains from incentives would be punished by tighter incentives, which leave the firm with 
less profits. Knowing or expecting this, firms would refrain from productivity 
improvements. In principle, the same holds for investments that lead to cost reductions or 
are sunk. Thus, commitment appears to be valuable.
27  
However, there is a widespread inability to commit. Regulators face legal constraints 
on commitment. Changes in regulatory personnel hinder personal commitments by 
previous regulators. There is an impossibility to write complete regulatory contracts.  
At the same time it can often be sub-optimal to exercise commitment. Flexibility may 
be highly valuable in a changing environment. This not only holds for learning from 
mistakes but also for the inability under commitment to adapt to new situations.  
A lack of commitment can be exogenous, reflecting a change in outside variables, 
such as inflation or political elections. It can also be endogenous, reflecting a change in 
regulatory variables, such as profit or investments (Grajek and Röller, 2009). Potential 
drivers for the effects of lack of commitment are efficiency, fairness and political 
influence.  
Commitment can be good for investment to the extent that it provides a reliable basis 
for the investment decisions and overcomes dynamic inconsistency of the regulators. It 
also prevents any ex post regulatory bias against profits. This is particularly relevant for 
infrastructure innovations with their potential for high profits or high losses. As an 
                                                 
26 For other relevant work see Baron and Besanko (1987), Gilbert and Newbery (1994) and Levy and 
Spiller (1996).  
27 Commitment appears to be particularly valuable, when it comes to investments. Innovations not based on 
investments but rather on learning by doing may be achievable without commitment. See Lewis and 
Yildirim (2002).   25
example symmetric profit and loss sharing can overcome the regulatory truncation 
problem. However, loss sharing cannot fully insure the firm (because consumers can opt 
out). Commitment is also relevant for cost-reducing incentives that potentially increase 
profits.  
The effects of a lack of commitment depend on the political/legal environment 
(“institutional endowment”). In a culture of symmetric fairness regulated firms may be 
shielded against large losses even if there is no commitment. In particular, the lack of 
commitment can deal with unexpected technological/market changes and can correct 
mistakes.  
As a result, commitment needs balancing with sensible flexibility/incentives (Levy 
and Spiller, 1996). The ability to achieve that is the strength of due process (U.S. 
approach). Due process rules themselves can be quite stable, depending on a country’s 
legal traditions. At the same time, they allow for flexibility but generally make it hard to 
implement sudden policy changes.    
In general, the longer the time horizon of a regulatory decision the less regulators can 
commit. Infrastructure investments have long lead times and long lives. As a result full 
regulatory commitment for the time horizon of an investment is not possible. A general 
result of the literature on Bayesian incentive regulation is that the less the regulator can 
commit to incentives (and the associated profits and losses) the weaker should incentives 
be. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is therefore in 
doubt 
Based on this insight I propose a two-period framework (based on Vogelsang, 2006), 
distinguishing a short period and a long period.  
The short period typically coincides with the length of a regulatory lag, or of (RPI-
X)-type adjustments or adjustments from profit sharing. During a short period the firm 
makes and executes decisions on operations, repairs and maintenance costs. For the time 
of a short period full regulatory commitment and steep incentives for cost reductions are 
feasible.  
The long (commitment) period corresponds to the time for revisions of (RPI-X)-
adjustments and of incentive mechanisms at the end of each long period. It could also 
correspond to the length of long-term contracts. Almost full commitment to incentives is   26
feasible inside a long period. However, beyond the long period such commitment is 
generally not feasible.  
Infrastructure investments go beyond several long periods so that only very basic 
regulatory commitment is possible for the time horizon of such investments. 
Consequently, little or no cost-reducing regulatory incentives are feasible over the time 
period relevant for infrastructure investment.  
How is the above discussion of the tightness of regulation affected by the two-period 
framework? First, too soft regulation is likely to lead to excess profits over time. Since 
such profits tend to be unacceptable to the public and hence to regulators, they reduce the 
length of the commitment period. Second, conversely, too tight regulation is likely to lead 
to losses over time. Since losses are also unacceptable to regulators, they also reduce the 
length of the commitment period. In contrast to both, intermediate regulation is less likely 
to lead to either excessive profits or excessive losses and is therefore more likely to be 
viable for longer than either soft or tight regulation. As a consequence, intermediate 
regulation enhances the commitment power and investment incentives. Intermediate 
regulation is compatible with short-term incentive regulation and extends the length of 
the short period. However, how can regulators commit to “intermediate regulation” in the 
first place?  
In the following we consider several approaches to intermediate regulation with some 
commitment power.  
5.2. A variant of rate-of-return regulation 
In the U.S. rate-of-return regulation has provided strong commitment for many 
decades and was generally associated with an allowed rate of return ≥ cost of capital 
(Evans and Garber, 1988).
28 In practice, rate-of-return regulation (intermediate to soft 
regulation) has been combined with a used-and-useful criterion for including assets in the 
rate base. This may counter any Averch-Johnson type overcapitalization tendencies. In 
fact, according to Gilbert and Newbery (1994) and Newbery (2000) it provides for an 
efficient approach to investing. At the same time, in the U.S., rate-of-return regulation 
represents a credible commitment because of Supreme Court decisions (“Hope”). And the 
                                                 
28 See, however, Joskow and MacAvoy (1975), for a period, where electricity rates were not cost covering.   27
used-and-useful criterion has been subject to extensive court review there. It may, 
however, introduce new regulatory uncertainties that could reduce investment incentives/ 
increase the cost of capital (Baumol and Sidak, 2002; Égert, 2009).
29 State-of-the-art cost 
models may reduce this uncertainty but will increase the costs and (initially) the time lag 
due to regulation.   
How can the rate-of-return regulation with used-and-useful criterion be combined 
with incentive regulation for cost reduction (and efficient pricing)? Price-cap regulation 
has been described as rate-of-return regulation with a pre-specified, long regulatory lag 
(Liston, 1993). Using this insight, rate-of-return regulation only needs to be applied at 
RPI-X updates.
30 This provides for some incentives and flexibility. Investment risks can 
further be reduced through the use of historic cost standards (Égert, 2009). Further 
downward flexibility through price caps could reduce any inefficiencies stemming from 
out-of-date historic costs.  
While at first blush this suggestion appears to be tailor-made for the U.S. only, it has 
to be kept in mind that current updates of price-cap regulation outside the U.S. also rely 
very heavily on rate-of-return criteria (in the form of actual and permissible WACC).  
5.3. Regulatory holidays 
A second option for implementing intermediate regulation with some commitment 
consists of regulatory holidays, which can be viewed as a form of commitment. Gans and 
King (2002 and 2003) establish conditions under which access holidays can increase 
investment incentives for innovative infrastructure.  
Regulatory holidays mean that regulation only begins with a lag after conditions for 
regulation (the regulatory requirement) have been met.
31 This lag can be viewed as a 
short period, for which commitment is feasible. In that case, the holiday is unlikely to be 
long enough for financing large sunk investments. Baake et al. (2005) therefore describe 
a scheme for establishing a longer regulatory holiday. At the same time, a commitment to 
such a long holiday for, say, 10-15 years may not really be credible. However, breaking 
                                                 
29 Égert (2009) also points out that the regulated firm may choose projects that will have a lower variance 
of expected outcomes if the investments will be judged with ex post information. 
30 Similarly, it can be applied to other incentive-regulation updates, such as new profit-sharing formulas or 
benchmark updates. 
31 When I talked in Peru about regulatory holidays the chief regulator of Osiptel, Guillermo Thornberry, 
asked: What is that? I have not had a holiday in 2 ½ years!   28
this kind of commitment and installing regulation may itself take time so that the “long 
period” in this case is likely to be longer than ordinary long periods.  
Unless they provide an incumbent with an insurmountable lead, regulatory holidays 
could be combined with intermediate regulation (based on the rate-of-return regulation 
variety discussed in the previous section) after the holidays expire. A combination of 
intermediate regulation with regulatory holidays could then spur investment.  
A major problem of regulatory holidays is that verifiable standards are needed to 
determine under which conditions regulatory holidays would be warranted. An example 
could be the very narrow definition of innovation under the EU approach, i.e., the non-
applicability of the EU communications framework three-criteria test mentioned above in 
Section 4. A somewhat wider criterion would be the creation of a new market, 
independent of the applicability of the three-criteria test. However, defining a new market 
poses itself severe difficulties, because the hypothetical monopoly test is usually hard to 
adapt to this case (Gual, 2003).   
Related to regulatory holidays is full and therefore (initially) unlimited deregulation 
of innovations and particularly risky infrastructure investments. The problem in both 
cases is that of finding criteria for such deregulation, which would have to be at least as 
strict as those for a regulatory holiday.
32 Deregulation does not necessarily include a 
credible commitment against re-regulation. However, a long lag is likely before re-
regulation becomes feasible. The FCC has some discretion of regulatory forbearance 
under the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996. It can refrain from regulation that 
reduces investment incentives. An example has been the lifting of unbundling 
requirements for the UNE-P (Platform of unbundled network elements) in 2004. In 
contrast to regulatory forbearance the FCC can actually exercise deregulation as a more 
credible commitment. This option has been exercised by the FCC for new fiber lines and 
it is claimed by proponents to have increased fiber deployment.    
Some countries have sunset clauses, under which regulation would end after a pre-
specified period of time. However, for example in Canada, they have raised commitment 
issues through extension of the sunset period (citation!). 
                                                 
32 Of course, the usual criteria for deregulation, which were established for legacy markets, would continue 
to hold for innovative markets. This would include the non-fulfillment of the three-criteria test to the extent 
that it can be measured.     29
5.4. Infrastructure sharing and long-term contracts 
Two approaches for facilitating bottleneck infrastructure investments are 
infrastructure sharing and long-term contracts (for access or unbundled network 
elements) between incumbent and alternative competitors. In both cases the investment 
risk is shared between incumbent and alternative competitors. The basic question in these 
cases is, to what extent does the type of regulation of infrastructure access change the 
overall risk of innovative infrastructure investments (rather than only its distribution)? Is 
some version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem applicable here?  
Infrastructure sharing between incumbent and access seekers can take the form of 
joint ownership so that infrastructure sharing commitments can cover the investment 
period. In this case there is genuine risk sharing ex ante. On top of that there are going to 
be real effects, because the infrastructure sharing reduces ex ante (first-mover) 
competition and affects competition ex post (which can be softer or fiercer, see Ilic et al., 
2009). Infrastructure sharing involves complex, long-term transactions with monitoring 
and collusion problems.  
Long-term contracts (ex ante) between incumbent and access seekers move away 
from the customary mandated short-term access, which provides a risk-free option for 
access seekers (Hausman, 1997; Pindyck, 2004). In contrast, long-term contracts would 
be desirable and there should be a surcharge for short-term access that would equal the 
value of the option. From a commitment perspective and because they tend to be 
incomplete, long-term supply contracts probably cannot cover the entire investment 
period.  
5.5. Repair models for insufficient investments under regulation  
There exist a number of repair models for insufficient investments under regulation. 
They have in common that they only cover specific types of investment or that they apply 
only to specific industries.
33 
Widespread universal service subsidies in telecommunications, now under discussion 
for broadband access, typically have one part of an industry or one class of consumers 
subsidize another. Most such mechanisms introduce some allocative inefficiency in the 
                                                 
33 Kwoka (2009) discusses several approaches in this area.   30
course of financing, for example, rural infrastructure. Public subsidies are the source of 
2009 stimulus packages for broadband access in several countries.
34  
Regulators have extorted investment commitment by regulated telecommunications 
carriers in exchange for favorable regulation, e.g., in New York state around 1990.  
Generation resource adequacy regulation has been introduced in a number of U.S. 
states in order to compensate investment disincentives from regulated electricity 
generation spot pricing.
35  
It appears that repair models for lack of investment can be most appropriate if the 
output produced with such investments has strong public goods properties and therefore 
cannot efficiently be sold in markets (like, for example, electricity reliability). They may 
also be called for if quality of service is being jeopardized by incentive regulation. As 
Kwoka (2009) points out, quality may involve costs that were not contemplated in 
incentive regulation.          
6. Conclusions 
I take a fairly general rather than case-specific approach to the relationship between 
regulation and investment. Nevertheless, the regulator will have to determine if 
investment problems and/or innovations play a major role in the particular industry. If 
that is the case then there are two main regulatory concerns for investment/innovation. 
They are uncertainty and the lack of regulatory commitment over the long time horizon 
associated with investment.  
Uncertainty leads to the truncation issue and thereby to an asymmetric error 
distribution that favors intermediate over tight and soft regulation. The regulatory 
commitment problem also favors intermediate regulation. In addition, it favors a 
regulatory review cycle with true-ups based on actual costs and based on rate-of-return 
criteria.  
The best balance between commitment and flexibility/incentives depends on a 
country’s institutional endowment, for example on its due process rules (Levy and 
Spiller, 1996).  
                                                 
34 For the contrasting effects of fiscal versus regulatory measures see Bauer (2009).  
35 For an extensive critique and literature review of generation adequacy, see Roques (2008).    31
Genuine innovations should not be regulated. However, strict and verifiable standards 
are needed for deregulation and for regulatory holidays based on the “innovation” 
argument. Under weaker criteria innovative infrastructure should be regulated lightly. An 
example for weak criteria for the presence of innovations could be the first applicability 
of EU communications framework three-criteria test.
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